



PAALEMENT  EUROPi£N  -
CABINET  OU  PR~SICSNT 
Check  against delivery 
A.DDRE.5S 
To  the 
AECA  NEW  YORK  C~APTER 
by 
Mr.  Pieter Dankert 
President  of  the  European  Parliarne~~ 
THE  RIVER  CLUB 
New  York 
Monday,  31st October,  1983 -----------------------------
PARLEMENT  EUROPhN 
CABINET CU PRtSIOENT  1 • 
Mr.  Chairman,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen, 
May  I  thank  you  for  the honour  that you  have 
done  me  in  invitinq me  to address  your younq 
and  thriving  organisation here  in New  York. 
Just over  one  month  ago  you  showed  my  colleague 
of  that other  co~~unity institution a  similar 
honour  in  inviting  him  to  speak  to you  in this, 
the  media  capital - and  I  would  add  the 
commercial  capital - of  the United States. 
Nearly  360  years  ago,  this city was  beginning 
its life under  the  Dutch  West  India Company. 
In  fact,  the man  who  founded  New  York,  Peter 
Stuyvesant,  came  from  a  village near  to  where 
I  was  born.  In  those  days,  the  Dutch  sent men 
to  the Americas,  in  1983,  we.send  our money-
Dutch  investment  in  the  OS  amounts  to  some 
24.1  billion dollars. 
I  shall  not give  the  same  emphasis  to  the  theme 
of  ''the  present European  Community  - United 
States relations and  issues
11  as Gaston  Thorn, 
President of  the Commission,  did  a  month  ago. PARLEMENT  EUROPtEN  2. 
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You  will  probably  welcome  that for  two  reasons. 
First, little reward comes  from hearing  the 
same  speech  twice.  Secondly,  the Commission 
and  the  European  Parliame~t are not  one  and  the 
same  institution;  I  am  glad  to  say  that the 
distinction between  the  elected and  the appointed 
organs  of  governments  exists  in  the  European 
Community  as  it does  in the  United States. 
I  should add,  to avoid any  misunderstanding, 
that  in general,  relations between  our  two 
Community  institutions are cordial,  and  our 
analysis of  US-EC  relations  inevitably has 
much  in  common. 
I  was  tempted  to begin  this  speech  today by 
announcing  the  34th year of crisis in the 
Atlantic Alliance.  Though  I  would  not have 
wished  to run  down  this relationship by  saying 
that - far  from  it.  Talk  of  a  crisis in  the 
Atlantic Alliance  is,  of  course,  as  old as  the 
Alliance itself.  And  yet it still functions. '· 
PARLEMENT  EUAOPEEN 
CA'BINET OU PRtSIOENT  3. 
If you  think  the crises in  transatlantic 
relations have  been  serious,  you  misht be 
reassured to discover  that we  have  a  considerable 
number  of disputes within  the Cor.'Inunity  itself. 
And  even  that still functions  •..  just. 
Relations  between  the  Co~~unity and  the  United 
States  now  constitute an  integral  part of  the 
All iar.ce  relationship  in de  facto  tert":~.S,  drar.N'i.ng 
on  the strength of  our  common  beliefs  in 
democratic principles  and  indivicual  and  social 
freedo~s.  They  were  born  of  the  need  for  cor.~on 
security and  economic  recovery after the  years 
of  devastation  brought about by  war. 
Many  of  the original  founders  of  the Atlantic 
alliance were  deeply  involved  in  the  establish-
ment  of  the European  Community.  The  birth of 
the Alliance was  not without difficulties,  but 
our relationship nevertheless continued to 
develop.  Should  we,  over  30  years later on, 
be  really worred by  any  of  the  so-called 
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I  believe that there is  some  cause for concern  - because complacency  in  such  circumstances  would 
itself be damaging.  Which  crises  am  I  referrinq 
to?  They  are concerned  firstly with  the  -
different approaches  we  have  towards  East-West 
relations.  For  example,  we  differed in our 
views  about  the  nature,and  our response  to,the 
Soviet  invasion of  Afghanistan.  The  dispute 
over the Urer~or  qas pipeline project,  concerned 
as it was  with  both high  technoloqy  exports 
and  its financial  structure was  an  immediate 
consequence  of  this. 
Secondly,  crises have arisen because  our 
industry  is competing  for  a  market which  is  no 
longer  expandinq.  This  concerns  particularly 
steel,  agricultural and  chemical  sectors to 
name  but a  few.  They  are  exacerbated by 
disputes about international monetary  policy. 
But above all else,  it is the debate  on  security 
which  has  become  the most pressing  problem.  In 
a  sense,  the security debate  is directly linked 
to both East-West problems  and  to our trade 
disputes. (_. 
I 
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These  problems  indicate the  slow,  underlyinq 
division that has  opened within the Alliance. 
A week  ago,  throughout Europe  and  in the  United 
States,  over  2 million people  demonstrated 
their anxiety about  the current direction of 
security policy in the Alliance  and  in the 
Warsaw  Pact.  Such  demonstrations  could 
not  take  place  in Eastern Europe.  They  showed 
that defence  issues are  no  lon9er  the exclusive 
preserve of official elites and  interested 
scholars.  Anxiety  about  nuclear policy in 
particular has  stirred wider public concern 
·about defence  issues qenerally. 
Paradoxically,  such public anxiety has  not 
yet had  the opportunity of beinq  thoroughly 
aired in one of the European  institutions, 
which many  consider to be well  suited for  such  a 
discussion - the European Parliament.  But 
this situation is chanqinq.  Partly because  our 
attempts to create a  European Defence  Community 
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were  fer many  years  excluded  from  the  European 
Community's  agenda.  Such  an  attempt at that 
t1me  was,  perhaps,  rather premature.  However, 
it is quite clear that fer  the  founding 
fathers  of  Europe  the security element was 
a  natural part of their overall plan. 
~owadays, European  foreign ministers do  discuss 
the political and  economic  aspects  of security 
ma~ters within  the  contex~ of what  we  call 
European Political Cooperation  (EPC).  Recently, 
there was  even  a  proposal  to  formally  discuss 
the  deployment of  intermediate  range nuclear 
missiles in Europe.  In ·the  European  Parliament 
en more  than one  occasion this year,  we  have 
had discussions  on  security issues.-Whilst  I 
understand the reluctance in some  quarters of 
the European Parliament to become directly 
involved in the military aspects  of  the  security 
debate,  I  feel  that no  parliamentary institution 
should  iqnore  a  matter of  such obvious  concern 
to the public. r"'  \._;. 
(. 
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Just as the  European  Community  and  the United 
States cannot neglect their common  security 
interests,  neither can  they  escape  from  their 
economic  inter-dependence. 
7. 
Many  years  a~o, it would  have  been  easier for 
Americans  to  assume  an  isolationist view  in 
economic  matters,  but almost  one-fifth of 
American  production  is now  exported and  one-
seventh  of American  GNP  is accounted for  by 
foreign  trade  - a  lot of  jobs  depend  on  this. 
Four  out of  five ~  jobs  in manufacturing  in 
the United States  in fact  come  from  foreign 
trade.  This  means  that our  trade disputes are 
even  more  salient than  they  used  to be. 
The  United States  and  the  European  Community 
together account for over a  third of world  trade. 
And  yet,  between  1973  and  1981  industrial 
production  in  the United States  rose by  double 
the amount  that it rose  in the  Community.  Over 
the  same  period,  the United States managed  to 
create  some  15  million new  jobs whilst Europe 
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the  United States and Japan  lead  the  European 
Community.  For  instance,  out of  ten computers 
sold  in Europe,  eight originate  in the United 
States;  out of  ten video  recorders  sold  in 
Europe,  nine  originate in Japan.  Estimates 
of  the world  production of  integrated circuits 
suggest that the  United States'  share is about 
62%,  that of  Japan  31i  and  that of  Europe  only 
7%. 
The  European  Co~rour.ity,  in  recent times,  has 
become  involved  in  a  series  of  disputes  with 
the  United States  over  the  question of  steel 
trading.  We  have  both been affected by  the 
downturn  in the world  steel market  and  the 
increased competition  which  has  come  from  the 
newly  industrialised countries.  The  voluntary 
restraint agreement,  negotiated at great pains 
last year,  was  clearly a  rather fragile agreement 
and it is now  in  jeopardy because  of  the  actions 
of  a  relatively minor  US  steel producer,  Also, 
on  special  steels,  we  in  the  European  Community 
have  been  forced  to claim compensation  through 
the  GATT  agreed  formula  because  a  voluntary 
understanding ultimately proved  iroposs~ble .. .  ( 
. 
PARL!MENT  EUROPC&N  . 9. 
CABINeT CU  PR~$10ENT 
In  the agricultural  sector also,  we  have  quite 
a  few difficulties.  OS  imports  froro  the  EEC 
are less  than  half  of  EEC  imports  from  the 
United  States,  yet even  here  we  find  that  the 
US  Administration  is  threatening us with  a 
trade war.  The  so-called "unfair  subsidies
11 
from  our Common  Agricultural  Policy are ?ointed 
to as  the  reason for  such  action.  Yet,  it must 
be  recognised that !!! countries  of  the 
industrialised world  support  their agriculturat 
producers  in one  way  or another  - partly because 
of  the unpredictability  of  climatic conditions 
and  partly because of  the  need  to  safeguard, 
as  far as possible,  a  reliable  source of  food. 
For  example,  in the  United States  in  1983 
direct income  (price  support)  per person 
employed  in aqriculture is estimated at 
$6,000,  whereas  in  the European  Community  the 
figure  is less than  $2,000. 
Farming  conditions  in  the  United States and 
the  European  Community  are different;  not only 
because  we  have  much  less agricultural  land 
availqble,  but also because,  as  a  result of 
historical  and  demographic  reasons,  we  have 
a  lar9er farming  population.  We  should be able (:· 
C.  .·  ._: 
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to face  up  to  such  facts  of life without coming 
to blows. 
Having  said this,  we  clearly £2  have  problems 
in  Europe with the  functionin9  of  the  CAP. 
The  European  ~arliarnent never  intended the  CAP 
to become  "the cuckoo  which  forced all the other 
birds out of  the nest".  Present difficulties 
in  US  agriculture do  n21  derive  from  the 
mechanisms  of  the CAP,  but  from changed 
economic conditions:  the  restrictive practices 
adopted  in  industrialised countries,  the  high 
dollar exchange  rate,  the  increasing di:ficulties 
of  developing countries  in paying  their debts, 
have  over  the last two  years  led  to a  fall  in 
total demand  for agricultural products.  The 
United States,  as  the largest exporter,  has  been 
the first to suffer from  this  (and  from  the 
embargo  on  exports to the  USSR)  •  There  have 
in addition been  changes  in the  structure of 
supply on world markets,  where  3n  increasingly 
important role is falling  to other countries, 
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We  have  always  tried to  develop  the Community 
into something  more  than  a  purely agricultural 
Community  by  focussing  on  the social,  economic 
and  industrial  issues which  challenge us  as well. 
I  do  not wish  to  imply  that the cost of  the  CAP 
has  been  too high  in absolute  terms,  but it 
is certainly  too high  in relation  to  the 
Community's  budget as  a  whole.  The  :·!ember 
States,  aware  of  this,  have  consequently  asked 
the European  Commission  to make  proposals  for 
the structural  reform of  the CAP. 
Basically,  the  proposals  aim at limiting price 
increases  and  restricting  the quantities to 
which  guaranteed prices apply. 
one of  the major agricultural  topics under 
discussion between  the United States and  the 
European  Community  are cereal  substitutes.  Some 
Member  States claim that our  structural dairy 
surpluses  result from  the  import of cereal 
substitutes which  have  encouraged  industrially-
oriented milk  production at the  expense  of 
. traditional  rural  farming.  They  will  only PARLEMlNT  EUROPlEN  - 12. 
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accept new  proposals  for  a  structural  reform 
of  the CAP  if imports of  these substitutes 
from  the United  States are halted or  limited. 
I  know  of at least one country which  is 
prepared to make  a  biq  issue out of  this. 
I  can assure you  that we  are  involved  in very 
serious discussions on  the  reform of  the CAP. 
From  a  political point of  view this  is  a  very 
difficult and delicate operation.  If the 
United States expects us,  on  the  one  hand,  to 
carry out  reform of  the  C~P,  they  should not, 
on  the other hand,  try to prevent  such  reforms 
from  being  implemented  in a  reasonable  way  by 
threatening  Europe with  a  trade war  from  which 
more  serious consequences  might well arise. 
For  instance,  on  cattle feedstuffs,  I  was 
surprised by  the ease with which  the  European 
Community  came  to an  agreement with  the major 
suppliers of  tapioca  and manioc  while being 
unable  to aqree with  the United States  on 
restrictions on qluten feed  exports  to the 
Community.  Perhaps  the fact that manioc 
exporters are mainly  Third World countries, 
......  _ ·-·-··  .....  a.Pd. have little negotiating clout has  something ( 
.  .-_ ... 
. 
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to do  with it.  Their case,  however,  would 
appear  to be  similar to  the American case  on 
corn gluten  food. 
The  list of  mutual  problems  does  not, 
unfortunately,  end  there.  European manufacturers 
and  traders are very  dependent  on  the dollar to 
finance  international  trade.  Estimates  suggest 
that as  much  as  80%  of world  trade  is 
denominated  in dollars,  despite  the  fact that 
the  European  Community  is a  larger trader than 
the United States.  The  Japanese  yen,  for 
instance,  is closely  tied to  the value of  the 
dollar,  despite Japanese  trading  with  a  large 
number  of  countries other  than  the  United 
States.  This  yen  exchange  rate,  and  I  would 
argue  the dollar exchange  rate,  against 
European currencies  frequently  does  not  reflect 
the  true underlying  tradin9 situation.  The 
high dollar exchange rate and  the  fluctuations 
in the value of  the dollar put at a  gross 
disadvantage  those  traders whose  exchan9e  is 
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Interest rates are another area  of  contention. 
The  United States Federal  Government
1s  budget 
deficit,  we  feel,  has  pushed up  interest rates 
in the United States to  such  an  extent that 
investment capital  in  Europe  is beinq  drawn 
over  to the United States,  to  the  detriment 
of  European  investment aims. 
Why  are all these matters  so  important  to 
Europe?  Europe  is at the beginnings of  a,  weak, 
recovery.  Unlike that seen  in  the  United  States 
at the moment,  it has all the  signs  of  petering 
out.  The  European  Parliament has  initiated a 
debate  on  European  economic  recovery  in  the 
absence  of any  such  initiatives from  the  other 
community  institutions,  from  whom  these are 
normally  forthcoming.  I  commend  to you  the 
working  report - to be used as  the basis for 
future debate - prepared by  two  eminent 
economists,  Mr.  Michel  Albert and  Professor 
James  Ball.  The  message  that these  two 
economists  convey  is both  desperate  and 
encouraging.  They  suqqest that without 
Community  initiatives,  Europe may  well  enter an 
era  of  "balkanisation",  under-employment, PARLEMENT  EUROPtEN 
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non-growth,  and  decadence,  which  in everyday 
life could be  translated into growing  despair 
and  sometimes  even  violence.  They  outline 
possible ways  of  recovery  which  exploit 
Community-level multipliers of efficiency. 
They  also suggest that a  strong  impetus ~ 
be given  to create  the necessary  psychological 
shock but it must  be  prudent enough  to 
prevent financial  upheaval  and  intelligent 
enough  to  command  the broad  support of all  those 
involved.  The  techniques  require  investment 
to  increase  supply  and  support demand  at the 
same  time,  techniques  to  restore balance  in 
public  finance  and  in company  accounts,  and  a 
consolidation of purchasing  power  with  a 
consequent  improvement  in employment.  This  is 
indeed a  tall order,  but the challenge must  be 
met. 
Mr.  Chairman,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen, 
If Europe  is to avoid becoming  a  dependent, 
underdeveloped region  ~n the long  term,  it must 
put its own  house  in order. (
: . 
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If no  concrete decisions are  taken,  for  instance, 
at the next European  summit  meetinq  in  December, 
we  shall be unable  to remain  on  a  competitive 
footing  with  you,  the Japanese  and  the  NICs. 
Despite my  liking for America  and  the Americans, 
I  would  not like Europe  to become  dependent  on 
the  United  States and  I  feel  sure  that this 
feeling  is mutual!  We  can help  each  other more 
constructively if we  both  have  strong  and 
healthy  economies,  and  therefore act on  a  basis 
of equality and  mutual  respect.  I  do  not 
consider the  problems  I  have mentioned  to be 
unsurmountable as  long  as  they are discussed 
at the negotiating  table and as  long  as  they 
are  seen  as disputes between  friends  and  equals. 
However,  in order to correct the divisions 
which are being created,  we  must  increase 
mutual  understanding  of  our different needs  and 
interests. 
The  business  and political communities  in America 
and  in the  European  Community  have  a  major  role 
to play  in  increasinq mutual  understanding. ( •.•.·  - .. , 
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St~tes have a  crucial interest in maintaining, 
and  extending if necessary,  the General  Agreement 
o~ Tariffs and  Trades.  The  United States is no 
longer an  isolated economic  power,  but is 
heavily dependent  upon  trade,  in which  the 
E·llropean~}  experience  is that much  longer. 
',~,. 
~e must  also try to recognise  the  internal 
domestic  pressures and  national  interests that 
influence national  policies and make  our 
agreeing  on  a  common  policy  that much  more 
difficult. 
The  European  Parliament has  no  formal  powers  in 
the field of  EEC-US  relations.  However,  we 
can  exert pressure for  developments  to take 
place  in particular directions by  our direct 
influence- through  the  European  Parliament's 
plenary sessions,  or through our indirect 
influence - via political colleagues  in national 
parliaments. . :'. 
(
·.>  .. 
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Orqanisations  such  as  the American-European 
Community  Association do have  a  most valuable 
role  in rebuilding  mutual  respect and  confidence 
that is vital 1f the Atlantic relationship is 
to  endure.  It has  the ability  to dispel 
misunderstandings  and  reconcile  diverqent 
interests. 
I  am  aware  that your  association  is not  limited 
to  the business cornnunity,  but provides  a 
useful  forum  to  "build bridges"  between 
politicians,civil servants,  lawyers,  trade 
unionists and  businessmen  on  both  sides of  the 
Atlantic.  It complements  the  most  positive 
bridge~building work  of  the six monthly 
parliamentary  exchanges  between  the United States 
Conqress  and  the European Parliament.  These are 
just some  of  the channels of communication  and 
consultation between  the  European  community 
and  the United States that we  should  encourage 
and build upon. 
Through  these open  channels  we  can better 
appreciate and  respect our differences and  thus 
close our widening  divergences. 